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Introduction 
This  paper  analyses  the  factors  which  influenced  the  Reichsbanks' 
decisions  to  change  the  official discount  rate  from  1876,  the  year  during 
which it started operations,  to  1913.  The  main  hypothesis  tested  is  that 
the  Reichsbank  reacted  systematically  to  changes  in  the  liquidity  ratios, 
the  ratios  of  gold  or  metal  holdings  to  its  short  term  liabilities.  To 
this  end  reaction  functions  which  use  changes  in  the  discount  rate  as 
the  dependent  variable are estimated. 
The  paper  also  goes  one  step  further  by  investigating  the  factors 
affecting  changes  in  the  liquidity ratios.  It  shows  that  changes  in  the 
differential  between  the  official  discount  rate  and  the  private  discount 
rate  in  Berlin  played  a  crucial.  role  in  determining  changes  in  the 
liquidity ratios.  It also  shows  that  the  changes  in  the differential were 
in  turn  influenced  by  the  business  cycle  and  by  foreign  interest  rates. 
Thus  three  links are  isolated  in the  transmission of  the  business  cycle  and 
the  foreign interest rate  to  the  changes  in  the  discount  rate:  a)  the  link 
from  the  business  cycle  and  the  foreign  interest  rate  to  the differential; 
b)  the  link  from  the  differential  to  the  liquidity  ratios  and  c)  the  link 
from  the  liquidity ratios  to  the official discount  rate. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  1  presents  a  model  of 
the  working  of  the  domestic  monetary  system  during  the  gold  standard  from 
which  the  hypotheses  subsequently  tested  are  derived.  Section  2  contains 
tests  of  these  hypotheses  namely,  that  the  business  cycle  and  the  foreign 
interest  rate  determine  the  differential  (Section  2a),  that  the 
differential  determines  liquidity  ratios  (Section  2b)  and  that  liquidity 
ratios  in  turn  determine  the  official  discount  rate  (Section  2c).  The 
empirical analysis  confirms  the hypotheses  that  changes  in liquidity ratios 
were  the  main  determinants  of  the  official  discount  rate  and  that  changes 
in  the  differential were  the  main  determinants  of  liquidity ratios.  The 
implications  of  the  analysis  for  the  working  of  the  gold  standard  in 
Germany  are  summarized  in  Section  3.  In  particular  the  nature  of  the 
automatic  transmission  of  impulses  from  the  business  cycle  and  the  foreign 
interest rate  to  the  discount  rate is analyzed. -2-
1.  The  determinants of  the official discount rate in Germany. 
This  Section focuses  on  the factors  affecting changes  in the official 
discount  rate  of  the  Reichsbank.  Bloomfield  (1959)  and  Goodhart  (1972) 
advanced  the  hypothesis  that  during  the  gold  standard  changes  in  the 
official  discount  rate  were  determined  by  changes  in  the  liquidity  ratios 
of  the  Central  Bank.  Bloomfield  showed  graphically  that  there  was  a 
negative  relationship  between  official  discount  rates  and  the  liquidity 
ratios  for  most  gold  standard  countries,  while  Goodhart  regressed  the 
discount  rate  of  the  Bank  of  England  on  its  liquidity  ratio  using  annual 
data. 
This  paper  tries  to  carry  the  analysis  of  the  factors  affecting  the 
official discount  rate. one  step  further  by also  analysing  the  determinants 
of  changes  in  the  liquidity  ratios.  A  model  is  developed  showing  that 
changes  in  the  liquidity  ratios  are  determined  by  fluctuations  of  the 
differential  between  the  more  flexible  market  discount  rate  in  Berlin  and 
the  official  discount  rate.  The  former  is  the  interest  rate  at  which 
commercial  banks  in  Berlin  discounted  short  term  papers.  The  model  also 
shows  that  changes  in  the  differential  are  influenced  by  the  foreign 
interest rates  and  the  position of  the  economy  in  the  cycle,  both  of  which 
can  be  considered,  for  the  purpose  of  the  analysis  of  the  short  run 
discount  rate policy of  the  Reichsbank,  as  exogenous  variables or variables 
determined  by past policies. 
Let  the  symbol  ~  indicate  a  first  difference,  BU  currency  in 
circulation,  SL  sight deposits  of  the  public at the Reichsbank,  p  the  price 
level,  y  real  income,  i  the  private  short  term  discount  rate  in  Berlin,  G 
gold holdings,  S  silver and  other metal holdings,  and  N notes  issued  by  the 
Reichsbank.  A superscript  r  stands  for  the Reichsbank  and  a  superscript  p 
for  the  public. 
The  demand  function for  currency in circulation and  sight deposits at 
the  Reichsbank is assumed  to  depend  on  the  price  level,  real  income  and  the 
private discount  rate in Berlin  (equation 1): 
(1)  BU  +  SL  = pf(y,i) -3-
The  supply of currency is defined as  the  sum  of monetary gold,  silver 
and  other  metals  (GP)  and  currency  issued  by  the  Reichsbank  and  held  by 
the  public  (N):1) 
(2)  BU  = GP  +  N 
In  the  model  presented  here  the  banking  system  and  the  nonbanking 
public  have  been  consolidated.  In  principle  it would  be  useful  to  keep 
them  separate  and  to  test  whether  the  data  justify the  consolidation.  The 
demand  for  gold,  silver  and  Reichsbank  notes  by  commercial  banks  may  be 
influenced  differently  by  interest  rates  and  the  business  cycle  than  the 
demand  by  the  non-banking  public.  Furthermore  the  demand  for  gold  and 
silver  by  commercial  banks  was  probably  influenced  by  the  amount  of  loans 
and  discounts  outstanding.  However  the  existing  data  do  not  allow  this 
disaggregation. 
Equation  (3)  states  that  the  proportion  of  metals  that  the  public 
desires  to  hold  is  a  constant  fraction  of  its holdings  of  notes  and  sight 
deposits  at  the  Reichsbank.  Equation  (3)  implies  that  the  public  is  not 
indifferent  with  respect  to  the  composition  of  its  currency  and  sight 
deposit  holdings.  Increased  world  production  of  gold  changed  however  the 
desired  ratio  in  the  long  run.  The  share  of  gold  and  silver  holdings  to 
currency issued  by  the  Reichsbank and  sight deposits at  the  Reichsbank fell 
from  214  per  cent  in  1876  to  103  per  cent  in 1888  during  the  period  of  gold 
scarcity.  It  reached  a  peak  of  150  per  cent  in  1906,  as  world  gold 
production  was  becoming  more  abundant  (Chart  1).  The  changes  in the ratio 
seemed  relatively  insensitive  to  the  short  run  German  business  cycle  and 
interest  rate  changes,  except  maybe  in  the  period  from  1888  to  1897.  As 
this  paper  deals  with short  run  fluctuations,  equation  (3)  seems  therefore 
a  plausible simplifying assumption. 
(3)  GP 
N +  SL 
(1)  Notes  issued  by  other issuing  banks  are neglected here  for  simplicity. 2
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Equation  (4)  states  that  German  net  foreign  financial  assets  (K) 
depend  on  the  difference  between  the  foreign  private  interest  rate  and  the 
private discount  rate in Berlin. 
(4)  K 
where  if stands  for  the  foreign  interest  rate.  Equation  (5)  states 
that  the  cumulated  current  account  surpluses  are  equal  to  the  sum  of  gold 
and  silver holdings  of  the  Reichsbank  (Gr)  and  the  public  plus  net  foreign 
financial  assets  of  Germany.  The  cumulated  current  account  surplus  is 
assumed  to  be  exogenous  to keep  the model  as  simple as  possible. 
(5)  ~C = Gr  + GP  + K 
An  additional  behavioural  equation  of  the  private  sector  explains 
the discounting of bills at  the  Reichsbank: 
(6)  as )O 
Where  DA  is  the  stock  of  bills  discounted  by  the  Reichsbank  and 
id  the  official  discount  rate  of  the  Reichsbank.  The  Reichsbank's 
balance  sheet  is given by: 
(7)  N +  SL 
Finally,  equation  (8)  defines  the  liquidity  ratio  of  the  Reichsbank 
as  the ratio of metal holdings  to total short  term liabilities: 
(8)  1 
N  + SL 
and  equation  (9)  states  that  the  official discount  rate  of  the  Reichsbank 
depends  on  the  liquidity ratios: (2) 
-6-
(9)  id = a6  - a7l  a7 >o 
The  system of  9  equations  contains  9  endogenous  variables: 
BU,  (SL  +  N),  i,  GP,  DA,  cr,  1,  K,  id  where  the  division  of  gold  and 
silver holdings  of  the  Reichsbank  and  the  private sector, as well as  of  N + 
SL  is not  determined  by  the  model.  The  exogenous  variables  are  p,  y, 
~.  The  above  system can  be  solved as  follows. 
·f  l.  , 
Consider  first  the  block  of  equations  (1)  - (5).  By  success!  v~ 
substitutions  the  5  equations  can  be  reduced  to  2  equations.  Assuming  for 
· the  moment  that  (Gr)  is  fixed,  the  2  equations  can  be  solved  for  i  and 
(N +  SL)  : 
(10)  i  = g1  <t,  ~, !f; cr,Jc) 
(11)  (N + SL)  = g2(t,  ~,if; cr,jfc) 
where  the  signs  of  the  partial  derivatives  are  indicated  above  the 
variables.  Equation  (10)  states  that  an  increase  in  the  price level,  real 
output  and  the  foreign  interest  rate  lead  to  an  increase  in  the  private 
discount  rate  in  Berlin,  for  given  cr.  An  increase  in  p  or  y  leads  to  an 
increase in N + SL,  while an  increase in the  foreign  interest rate leads  to 
a  fall. 
Consider  next  the  second  block  of  equations  in  the  model,  equations 
(6)  - (8).  Substituting  equations  (6)  and  (7)  into  (8)  one  obtains  that 
the  liquidity  ratio  depends  negatively  on  the  differential  between  the 
private  and  the official discount  rates: 
1 
(12)  1  = 14  -
N +  SL 
The  equations  which  will  be  subject  to  empirical  tests  in  the  next 
section are equations  (9),  (10),  and  (12'). -7-
Summarizing  the  three hypothesis  advanced  and  tested are: 
a)  the  business  cycle  and  foreign  interest  rates  determine  the 
differential between  the  private short  term discount  rate in Berlin and  the 
official discount  rate of  the  Reichsbank; 
b)  the  differential  determines  the  liquidity  ratios  of  the 
Reichsbank; 
c)  changes  in  the  liquidity ratios  determine  changes  in  the  official 
discount  rate. 
2.  Empirical tests 
Equation  (10)  can be  linearized in the  following  way: 
where  the  coefficients  of  the  variables  Gr  and  Jc  have  been  set  for 
simplicity equal  to  zero. 
Equation  (12)  can  be  expressed  in first  differences  as  follows  for  a 
given value  of  (N  + SL): 
o(4 >o 
where  the  coefficient  of  the  variable  (N  +  SL)  has  been  arbitrarily  set 
equal  to  zero,  and  Equation  (9)  can  be  rewritten  in first  differences  as 
follows: 
These  three  equations  represent  each  one  of  the  channels  that  will  be 
investigated  econometrically  by  using  annual  data  and,  whenever  possible, 
data collected for  each discount  rate change.  The  use  of  the latter set of 
data  allows  tests  of  these  hypotheses  which  are  more  reliable  than  those 
performed  before by  other  authors.  Annual  data  hide  a  substantial  amount -8-
of  information.  Changes  in  the  discount  rate  in  Germany  were  rather 
frequent  during  the  gold  standard  period,  amounting  to  136  from  1876  to 
1913.  There  were  38  changes  in  the  20  years  from  1876  to  1895 
corresponding  to  1.9  changes  per  year  on  average,  as  opposed  to  98  changes 
in the  18  years  from  1896  to  1913,  corresponding  to  5.4  changes  per year on 
average.  Fluctuations  in  the  liquidity  ratios  within  the  year  were  also 
extremely high.2)  In addition the  use  of annual data could  probably entail 
problems  of  reverse  causation.  For  these  reasons,  whenever  the 
availability  of  data  allowed  it,  regressions  using  annual  data  have  been 
supplemented  by  regressions  using  data  available  for  each  discount  rate 
change  and  drawn  upon  two  statements  of  the  Reichsbank.  The  first ··one 
dated  two  to  four  days  prior  to  the  discount  rate change  and  the  second  one 
generally preceding it by  two  weeks  to  two  months.  The  choice  of  the  lags 
was  made  by  the  compilers  of  a  table  contained  in  one  volume  published  by 
the  German  Imperial  Printing  Office  in  1925  {Vergleichende 
Notenbankstatistik,  1925). 
The  choice  of  the  lags  was  based  presumably  on  the  knowledge  of  the 
statements  which  the  Reichsbank actually_compared  prior to deciding  changes 
in the  discount  rate.  The  table also  contains  information  about  the  short 
term market  interest rates  and  exchange  rates  on  the  day  just preceding  the 
discount  rate  change.  Exactly  the  same  table  is  available  for  other  gold 
standard  countries,  possibly  suggesting  that  the  type  of  comparisons  of 
statements  done  by  the  officials  of  the  Reichsbank  was  a  usual  practice 
among  gold  standard central bankers.  A contribution of  this  paper lies also 
in bringing  to  the attention of  the readers  this  remarkable  set of data. 
The  tests have  been  performed  separately for  the  pe·riods  1876  or  1878 
to  1895  and  from  1896  to  1913.  1895  has  been  chosen  as  the  end  year  for 
(2)  The  difference  between  the  highest  and  the  lowest  level  of  gold 
holdings  as  a  ratio  of  average  annual  gold  holdings  reached. a  maximum  of 
50.6  percent  in 1905  and  a  minimum  of  22.9  in 1892.  The  difference  between 
the  highest  and  the  lowest  level  of  fiduciary  notes  outstanding  as  a 
fraction  of  average  yearly  total  Reichsbank  notes  outstanding  reached  a 
maximum  of  74.6  percent  in  1912  and  a  minimum  of  23.8  percent  in  1877. 
Variability within the  year of notes  outstanding  increased substantially in 
the  second  part  of  the  gold  standard  period.  It goes  without  saying  that 
part  of  the  variability  of  both  assets  and  liabilities  was  caused  by 
seasonal  factors.  A similar variability is  observed  for  the  gold  holdings 
and  fiduciary  notes  outstanding  of  the  Bank  of  England,  while  it  was 
substantially  lower  for  the  other  central  banks  for  which  comparable  data 
are available. -9-
the  first  period  because  the  phase  of  declining  prices  in  Germany  and 
abroad  came  to  an  end  in  that  year after  the  discoveries  of  new  gold mines 
and  of  new  processes  to  extract  gold.  Moreover,  the  degree  of  commercial 
and  financial  integration  with  the  other  gold  standard  countries  had 
increased  substantially  since  1876  justifying  the  split  into  subperiods. 
For  the  first  period  the  London  private  interest  rate  was  used  as  the 
representative foreign interest rate.  For  the  second  period  the  Paris rate 
was  used,  because  the  degree  of  financial  market  integration  between 
Germany  and  France  had  by  then  become  higher  than  that  between  Germany  and 
the  United  Kingdom3).  Several  liquidity ratios  were  used.  In regressions 
using  annual  data  the  ratios  of  gold  and  of  all  metal  holdings  to  notes 
outstanding were  used.  Annual  regressions  shown  in  Table  2  and  5  include 
only  the  former  ratio,  because  it  yielded  better  results.  In  the 
regressions  using data relating to  each discount  rate _change,  the ratios  of 
all metals  to  banknotes  outstanding  and  of  all metals  to  total  short  term 
liabilities  outstanding  (banknotes  and  sight  deposits)  are  used  because 
they are  the  only ones  available. 
The  estimates  of  equation  (10')  are  presented  in Table  1.  Estimates 
of  equation  (12 ')  using  annual  data  are  presented  in  Table  2  while  those 
using  data  relating  to  each  discount  rate  change  are  presented  in Table  3. 
Estimates  of  equation  (9')  using  data  relating  to  each  discount  change  are 
presented  in  Table  4  while  those  using  annual  data  are  presented  in 
Table  5. 
2.1.  The  determinants of  the  private interest rate in Berlin. 
Estimates  of  equation  (10')  are  presented  in  Table  1.  The  price 
level  and  the  level  of  income  as  expressed  are  deviations  from  trend. 
Measures  of  the  business  cycle  could  only  be  constructed  on  an  annual 
basis.  4)  Therefore  the  empirical  tests  of  equation  (10')  could  only  be 
performed  using annual data.  Regressions  of  the official discount  rate and 
the  differential  between  the  private  and  the  official  discount  rates  are 
also  presented  in  the  lower  part  of  the  table.  In  the  block  of  equations 
(3)  Regressions  of  German  interest  rates  on  foreign  interest  rates  show 
that  in  the  second  period  the  Paris  rate  had  a  higher ·explanatory  power 
than  the  London  rate.  See  Sommariva  and  Tullio  (1987). 
(4)  The  measures  used  were  deviations  from  trend  of  both  income  and 
prices.  Trends  were  calculated separately for  the  two  subperiods.  For  the 
estimated  trends  see  Sommariva  and  Tullio  (1987). P
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(1)-(5)  from which equation  (10')  was  derived,  the official discount rate 
does  not  appear.  However,  the  official discount  rate  could  be  substituted 
for  the  private  discount  rate  in  the  demand  for  currency  in  circulation 
(eq.(1))  and  the capital flow equation  (eq.(4)).  Hence  an equation such as 
(10')  can  be  estimated  also  for  the  official  discount  rate  and  a  fortiori 
for  the differential between  the  two  rates. 
The  results  confirm  that  in  the  first  period  the  level  of  both 
interest  rates  was  more  affected  by  the  deviations  from  trend  of  consumer 
prices,  while  in  the  second  period  it  was  more  influenced  by  deviations 
from  trend  of  real  NNP.  The  private  short  term  rate  was  always  more 
responsive  than  the  official  discount  rate.  The  estimated  coefficients 
imply  that  in  the  second  period  the  private  short  term  interest  rate  in 
Berlin  rose,  other  things  being  equal,  by  about  9.  63  basis  points  for 
every  1  percent  rise  of  real  NNP  above  trend.  5)  The  corresponding  figure 
for  the official rate was  6.96  basis  points.  This  procyclical movement  of 
the  private  short  term  interest  rate  confirms  Morgenstern's  results,  that 
the  specific interest rate cycle  and  the  reference  cycle  were  in  the  same 
phase  in  81.9  percent  of  the  months  from  February  1878  to  August  1913.6) 
The  interest elasticity of  the  demand  for  currency in circulation and  sight 
deposit  implicit  in  the  second  regression  of  Table  1  is  -0.10,  if  one 
assumes  an  income  elasticity  of  1  and  -0.04  if  one  assumes  the  more 
plausible  income  elasticity  of  0.42  obtained  by  Sommariva  and  Tullio 
(1987).  As  to  the  interest elasticity of  net  capital  flows  in relation to 
the  domestic-foreign  interest  rate differential,  a  coefficient  of  if equal 
to 1  in regressions  2  and  4  of  Table  2  implies  an infinite elasticity for  a 
one  year  time  horizon.  A  coefficient  equal  to  zero  would  imply  a  zero 
elasticity. 
The  last  regressions  in  the  table  explain  the  differential  in  terms 
of  the  exogenous  variables.  The  differential  between  the  private  and  the 
discount  rate  underwent  large  fluctuations  during  the  gold  standard.  7) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
This  is slightly less  than half of  the size of  the coefficients  found 
by  Tanzi  (1980)  for  the  short  term  US  interst  rates  from  1959  to 
1975. 
Morgenstern  (1959,  Table  14,  p.93). 
The  differential  is  always  positive  when  annual  averages  are  used, 
1.. 
because  the  official  rate  was  the  rate  charged  on  loans  of  varied 
quality,  while  the  private rate refers  to  lower  risk loans.  However, 
during  the  period  the  official rate fell  from  time  to  time  below  the 
private rate. - 12-
The  exogenous  variables explain 68  percent  of  the  variance of  the differen-
tial in  the  first  period  and  39  per  cent  in  the  second  period.  The  cycles 
of  real  NNP  and/or  prices exerted a  positive effect on  the differential,  as 
already  found  by  McGouldrick  using  the  reference  cycles  of  Burns  and 
Mitchell.  8)  The  loss  of  significance  of  the  foreign  short  term  interest 
rate  in  the  second  period  occurs  partly  because  of  the  more  frequent 
changes  in  the  discount  rate  which  shortened  the  lags  between  changes  in 
the  foreign  private  short  term  rate  and  the  official  discount  rate  in 
Berlin.  As  a  result  the effects of  the foreign interest rate on  the  Berlin 
differential does  not  show  up  in the  annual  averages. 
2.2.  The  determinants of  the liquidity ratios of  the Reichsbank 
Regressions  explaining changes  in the  liquidity ratios  of  the  Reichsbank in 
terms  of  the  differential  are  shown  in  Tables  2  and  3  (equation  12'). 
Table  2  uses  annual  data  and  Table  3  data  relating  to  each  discount  rate 
change .9)  Table  2  also  shows  regressions  of  the  liquidity  ratios  on  the 
cyclical  variables  and  the  foreign  interest  rate.  The  regressions,  using 
annual data,  are less satisfactory than the others,  because annual averages 
hide  relevant  information.  In  the  first  period  the  non  adjusted  R2  in 
the  regression  explaining  annual  changes  in  the  gold  cover  of  notes 
outstanding  is  0.28,  while  the  adjusted  R2  varies  from  0.37  to  0.38  in 
the  regressions  using  data  relating  to  each  discount  rate  change.  In  the 
second  period  the results  of  Table  3  are  again  superior  to  those  of  Table 
2.  The  tables  also  show  that  the  explanatory  power  of  the  differential 
increased  substantially  during  the  second  period,  suggesting  a  more 
important  role  of  the differential in the  latter period.  During  the first 
period  factors  other  than  the  differential  were  relatively  more  important 
in affecting  the  liquidity ratios,  such as  changes  in the  demand  for notes 
and  sight  deposits  at  the  Reichsbank  whose  coefficient  was  arbitrarily set 
equal  to  zero  in  equation  (12').  This  is  suggested  by  the  fact  that  the 
explanatory power  of  the  cyclical variables  in Table  2,  the  cycle  being  an 
(8)  He  found  that  during  the  6  business  upswings  the  spread  as  defined 
here  increased  by  43  basis  points  on  average.  It fell  by  42  basis 
points  on  average during  the  5  downswings. 
(9)  The  coefficients  of  Tables  2  and  3  have  to  be  interpreted  with 
caution  because  in equation  (12')  the  coefficient  of  (N+SL)  has  been 
arbitrarily set  equal  to  zero.  However  because  changes  in i-id and 
(N+SL)  are  likely  to  be  multicollinear,  since  both  depend  on  the 
business  cycle,  it was  preferred  not  to  try  to  include  them  both as 
regressors. T
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important  determinant  of  the  demand  for  notes,  is  higher  ·than  the 
explanatory  power  of  the differential in the first period,  while  this is no 
longer  true  in  the  second  period.  In  the  first  period  a  100  basis  points 
higher differential  implied  a  fall  of  12  percentage  points  of  the ratio of 
metal holdings  to notes  outstanding and  of  7  percentage points  of  the ratio 
of  metal  holdings  to  total  short  term  liabilities.  During  the  second 
period,  a  100  basis  point  higher  differential  implied  a  fall  of  18  and  10 
percentage  points  respectively.  These  fluctuations  were  quite  sharp  and · 
occured within a  relatively short period of  time  or less  than  two  months  on 
average. 
Finally,  Table  3  shows  that  ·the  coefficient  of  the  differential  was 
highly  significant  in  also  explaining  absolute  gold  holdings  and  earning 
assets  (Equation  6)  in addition  to  the  liquidity ratios of  the  Reichsbank. 
Both  the  absolute  gold  stock  of  .the  Reichsbank  and  -earning  assets  are 
expressed in millions  of  marks.  During  the  first  period  a  100  basis  point 
higher  differential on  the  day  prior  to  the  discount  rate  change  implied a 
29.8  million  mark  fall  in  the  gold  stock  of  the  Reichsbank.  The 
corresponding  figure  in  the  second  period  was  88.2  million.  The  effect of 
the differential on  the  level of  earning assets was  even more  pronounced  in 
both sub  periods.  The  threefold  increase  in these coefficients reflects in 
part  the  growth  of  the  German  economy  and  the  rise  in  the  price  level 
between  the  two  periods,  and  in  part  a  genuine  greater ·responsiveness  of 
the  balance  sheet  items  to  the  differential.  Changes  in  the  differential 
must  have  influenced  the  liquidity  ratios  mainly  via  larger  discounts  of 
bills at  the  Reichsbank  coupled  with  an  initial phase  of  passive  behaviour 
of  the  Reischbank  during  which  the  profit  motive  prevailed.  The  increase 
in earning assets of  the  Reichsbank must  have  led initially to  a  one  to  one 
increase  in  the  sum  of  Reischbank  notes  and  short  term  liabilities 
outstanding.  The  effects  on  the  liquidity  ratios  was  reinforced  if  some 
of  the  proceeds  from  the  rediscounting were  converted  by  the  private sector 
into gold. 
2.3.  The  determinants of  the official discount rate of  the  Reichsbank. 
Table  4  presents  regressions  of  the  changes  in  the  discount  rate  on 
changes  in  the  liquidity  ratios  (equation  (9')).  The  data  used  relate  to T
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each  discount  rate  change.  Table  5  presents  the  same  regressions  using 
annual  data.  Changes  in  the  liquidity  ratios  between  the  two  Reichsbank 
statements  explain  60  to  70  percent  of  the  variability  of  the  changes  in 
the discount  rate  (Table  4).  The  coefficients of  the liquidity ratios have· 
the  expected  negative  sign  and  are  very  significantly different  from  zero. 
They  indicate  that  a  fall  of  one  percentage  point  in the ratio of metal  to 
notes  outstanding led to  the decision to raise the discount rate by  6  basis 
points  in the first  priod and  3  basis  points  in  the  second.  The  Reichsbank 
was  more  responsive  to  changes  in  the  ratio  of  metal  holdings  to all short 
term  liabilities:  a  one  percentage  point  fall  in  the  latter  led  to  a  10 
basis  point  increase  in  the  discount  rate in  the  first  period,  and  6  basis 
points  in  the  second.  By  multiplying  the  coefficients  of  the differential 
basis  point  increase in  the  discount  rate  in  the  first  period,  and  6  basis 
points  in  the  second.  By  multiplying  the  coefficients  of  the differential 
in  the  equations  explaining  the  liquidity  ratios  (Table  3)  with  the 
coefficients  of  the  liquidity  ratios  in  the  equation  explaining  discount 
rate changes  (Table  4),  one  obtains  that  a  100  basis  point  increase  in  the 
differential  led  in  the  first  period  to  63.7  - 65.2  basis  points  increase 
in  the  official  discount  rate,  depending  on  the  liquidity  ratio  used  for 
the  calculation.10)  In  the  second  period,  the  response  of  the  Reichsbank 
was  also less  than full  being  in the  order of 61.2  to  62.0  basis  points  for 
every 100  basis  points  increase  in the differential. 
The  same  regressions  using  annual  data  (Table  5)  support  the 
empirical  results  of  Table  4.  In  the  second  period  the  ratio  of  gold  to 
notes  outstanding  explains  a  smaller  fraction  of  the  annual  variance  of 
changes  in  the  discount  rate  due  to  the  greater  variability  of  the 
liquidity  ratios ·and  of  the  discount  rate within  the  year.  The  R2  of  the 
regression  using  annual  data  is  only  0.49  for  the  second  period  (Table  5) 
as  opposed  to  an  R2  of  about  0. 70  in  the  regression  of  Table  4  relating 
to  the corresponding  period. 
(10)  The  coefficients in the  tables  are  rounded  up  and  their multi-
plication does  not  give  precisely the  figures  reported here. T
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3.  Summary  and  Conclusions 
This  paper's  first  objective  was  to  test  the  hypothesis  that 
liquidity  ratios  of  the  Reichsbank  were  the  main  determinants  of  official 
discount  rate  changes.  To  this  end  an  interesting  data  source,  not  yet 
exploited,  was  used.  These  data  refer  to  each  discount  rate  change  and 
yield  estimates  which  are  free  of  problems  of  reverse  causation.  The 
empirical  tests  show  that  changes  of  the  liquidity  ratios  explain  a  very 
high  fraction  of  the  variance  of  discount  rate  changes,  a  result which  is 
very  similar  to  Goodhart's  (1972)  finding  about  the  determinants  of  the 
official discount  rate in the  United  Kingdom. 
Secondly,  this  paper  has  also  investigated  the  factors  affecting  the 
liquidity  ratios  of  the  Reichsbank.  Changes  in  the  differential  between 
the  private  discount  rate  in  Berlin  and  the  official  discount  rate  were 
found  to  determine  changes  in the  liquidity ratios.  Thirdly the effects of 
the  business  cycle  and  the  foreign  interest  rates  on  the  level  of  the 
private discount  rate and  the differential has  also  been  investigated. 
The  econometric 
provides  interesting 
standard in Germany. 
investigation  of  the  three  links  mentioned  above 
insights  into  the  working  of  the  domestic  gold 
First the  tests suggest  that  liquidity ratios were  an 
automatic  signalling  device  for  a  central  bank  princip·ally  interested  in 
keeping  the  notes  in  circulation  convertible  into  gold  and  in  making 
profits.  The  perfection  of  the  working  of  the  system  lay  in an  automatic 
and  prompt  transmission of  information about  the  position of  the  economy  in 
the  cycle  and  the  inflation outlook  through  the  behaviour  of  the  liquidity 
ratios.  In  this  connection  the  equation  explaining  the  discount  rate 
presented  in Table  1  have  to  be  interpreted with caution;  they  do  not  imply 
that  the  Reichsbank was  directly reacting  to  the  position of  the  economy  in 
the cycle,  to deviations  of  prices  from  their trend  and  to  foreign  interest 
rates,  but  rather  that  these  variables  were  influencing  the  liquidity 
ratios  through  the widening  and  narrowing of  the differential,  and  that  the 
Reichsbank  was  reacting  to  changes  in  the  liquidity  ratios  .11)  Thus  the 
(11)  Bloomfield held  a  similar view. -20-
analysis  presented in this paper  suggests  that it is incorrect  to attribute 
to  central banks  of  the  gold  standard  years  objectives  of  today's  central 
banks,  like  the  stabilization  of  economic  activity  or  full  employment. 
Their  objectives  were  much  narrower  and  more  clearly  defined.  One 
important  reason  for  this  behaviour  is  that  accurate  statistics  about 
business  cycles  and  the  balance  of  payments  were  not  promptly  available as 
they  are  today,  although  during  the  gold  standard  central  banks  had 
probably  some  knowledge  of  the  state of  the  business  cycle  and  the  balance 
of  payments. 
Second,  the split of  the  period allows  to infer that the  relevance of 
the  differential  in  influencing  discount  rate  changes  was  greater  in  the 
second  period,  probably  because  of  the  better knowledge  of  the  Reischsbank 
about  the  working  of  the  system,  of  the  stronger  links  among  the  Berlin 
money  market  and  the  foreign  ones  and  of  the  more  frequent  changes  in  the 
discount  rate.  This  evidence  suggests  that  the  working  of  the  system  was 
more  automatic  on  average  in  the  second  part  of  the  gold  standard.  As  a 
result,  the  role  of  discount  rate  changes  and  of  German  monetary  policy as 
a  tool  for  stabilization of  economic  activity  and  of  the  price  level must 
have  increased in the latter period. 
The  model  presented  in  Section  1,  contains  9  structural  equations. 
Three  reduced  form  equations  have  been  derived  from  it  and  have  been 
further  simplified  by  setting  equal  to  zero  the  coefficients  of  several 
explanatory  variables  which  were  thought  likely  to  be  multicollinear  with 
the  key  explanatory  variables.  It  maybe  worthwhile  to  estimate 
simultaneously  the  9-equation  structural  model  by  a  full  information 
maximum  likelihood method.  This  is left, however,  for  further  research. -21-
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